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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890154-CA 
v. : 
DARYL WAYNE SEAGROVES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated 
assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978), and assault, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978). Defendant pled 
guilty to misdemeanor assault prior to his trial by jury on 
aggravated assault in Fifth District Court, in and for Iron 
County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, judge, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 78-21-3(2)(h) 
(1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to six months in jail for the misdemeanor 
assault conviction to run consecutively to a prison term of up to 
five years for the aggravated assault conviction. Defendant does 
not contest the validity of his convictions for aggravated 
assault and assault; his claim of error is limited to the 
propriety of the consecutive sentences which, he claims, serve to 
frustrate the "constitutional function" of the board of pardons. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102 (1978): 
Assault—(1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978): 
Aggravated assault—(1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means 
or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the 
third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988): 
Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, 
a court may sentence a person adjudged guilty 
of an offense to any one of the following 
sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from disqualification of 
public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-202(1) (Supp. 1988): 
Every person who is committed to the state 
prison to serve an indeterminate term and who 
thereafter is released on parole shall, upon 
completion of three years on parole without 
violation, or in the case of a person 
convicted of violating section 76-5-301.1, 
Subsection 76-5-302(1)(e), section 76-5-402, 
section 76-5-402.1, section 76-5-402.2, 
section 76-5-402.3, section 76-5-403.1, 
_o_ 
section 76-5-404, section 76-5-404.1, or 
section 76-5-405, or attempting to violate 
any of those sections, upon completition of 
ten years on parole, without violation, be 
terminated from his sentence, unless the 
person is earlier terminated by the board of 
pardons. Any person who violates the terms 
of his parole, while serving parole, shall at 
the discretion of the board of pardons be 
recommitted to prison to serve the portion of 
the balance of his term as determitned by the 
board of pardons, not to exceed the maximum 
term. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1978) (amended 1989): 
Concurrent or consecutive sentences— 
Limitations• 
(1) Subject to the limitations of subsection 
(2) through (5), a court shall determine, if 
a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall 
run concurrently unless the court states, in 
the sentence, that they shall run 
consecutively. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(9) (Supp. 1989): 
Concurrent or consecutive sentences— 
Limitations. 
(9) This section may not be construed to 
limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989): 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons shall determine 
by majority decision when and under what 
conditions, subject to this chapter and other 
laws of the state, persons committed to serve 
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at 
penal or correctional facilities which are 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment, or as otherwise 
limited by law, may be released upon parole, 
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their 
fines, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, 
or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
(b) No restitution may be ordered, no 
fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no 
parole, pardon, or commutation granted or 
sentence terminated, except after a full 
hearing before the board or its appointed 
examiner in open session. 
(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant 
hearings, rehearings, and parole revocation 
hearings, timely prior notice of the time and 
place of the hearing shall be given to the 
defendant, the county attorney's office 
responsible for prosecution of the case, the 
sentencing court, law enforcement officials 
responsible for the defendant's arrest and 
conviction, and whenever possible, the victim 
or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his 
representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, 
and any related rules made by the board under 
that section. This information shall be 
provided in terms that are reasonable for the 
lay person to understand. 
(3) The determinations and decisions of the 
Board of Pardons in cases involving approval 
or denial of any action, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, 
orders of restitution, or remission of fines, 
forfeitures, and restitution, are final and 
are not subject to judicial review. Nothing 
in this section prevents the obtaining or 
enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter may be 
construed as a denial of or limitation or the 
governor's power to grant respite or 
reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or 
conviction or impeachment. However, respites 
or reprieves may not extend beyond the next 
session of the Board of Pardons and the 
board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may 
commute the punishment, or pardon the offense 
as provided. In the case of conviction for 
treason, the governor may suspend execution 
of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The 
Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its 
execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under 
what conditions offenders serving sentences 
may be released upon parole, pardoned, have 
restitution ordered, or have their fines or 
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences 
commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons 
shall consider whether the persons have made 
A _ 
or are prepared to make restitution as 
ascertained in accordance with the standards 
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a 
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of 
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or 
termination of sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Daryl Wayne Seagroves, was charged with 
aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault in Fifth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Iron County, before the Honorable J. 
Philip Eves. He pled guilty on the first day of trial to 
assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102 (1978). He was then tried by a jury and convicted of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978). Defendant was sentenced to up to 
five years in the Utah State Prison for the aggravated assault 
conviction. He was sentenced to a consecutive six-month term in 
the Iron County Jail for the misdemeanor assault conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, and early morning 
on New Year's Day, January 1, 1989, defendant was drinking at the 
Playhouse Bar in Cedar City, Utah (T. 56-58). After the bar 
closed, defendant and others (including his girlfriend, Deborah 
Seagroves; a friend, Terry Gideon; and the bar doorman, Kurt 
Mackay) assembled outside the bar prior to leaving (PH 23). 
Defendant's girlfriend wanted to use the bathroom, so the 
doorman, Kurt Mackay, let her in the back door of the bar (PH 8). 
References are made to the preliminary hearing transcript 
(hereinafter MPH"), the trial transcript (hereinafter HT M), and 
the district court file (hereinafter HR M). 
After exiting the bar, as they were walking around a corner, 
defendant blindsided Mackay with a blow to the side of the head 
(PH 23). The blow knocked him to the ground (PH 24), and 
defendant then proceeded to stomp on his head (PH 25). Mackay 
suffered a cracked skull and jaw, a concussion, a split lip, and 
a bruised ear (PH 10, 11, 15). Prior to trial, defendant pled 
guilty to a class B misdemeanor assault for his attack on Mackay 
(T. 35). Consequently, Mackay did not testify at trial and the 
details related to that assault were not presented to the jury. 
After leaving the bar, defendant and three others left 
for the American Siesta Motel where they were living (T. 62). 
Defendant's girlfriend, Deborah Seagroves, was afraid of him and 
refused to ride with him, so Terry Gideon took her home; 
Seagroves intended to pick up her baby and some clothes and spend 
the night with a friend (T. 61). Defendant drove in a separate 
car (T. 62). Shortly after arriving at the motel, defendant 
became involved in an argument with Gideon (T. 68). Defendant 
became enraged and threatened to kill Gideon (T. 68). Part of 
the argument took place while defendant was seated in a car and 
Gideon was standing five feet from the car (T. 68). In an effort 
to calm defendant down, Gideon approached the car and reached 
inside to hold defendant (T. 68). After some scuffling and 
grabbing, Gideon stepped away from the car and realized that 
defendant had stabbed him several times with a knife (T. 70). 
Gideon left to seek medical attention (T. 72). Gideon's eleven 
stab wounds were located on his back, neck, chest, leg and near 
his left eye (T. 34-37); the wounds required suturing (T. 80). 
After defendant stabbed Gideon, he ran inside the motel 
and exclaimed to Scott Quinton, defendant's roommate, that he had 
gotten in a fight with Gideon and "cut him pretty bad" (T. 64, 
66). Defendant saw the police outside and got into bed (T. 66). 
The police, with the assistance of Deborah Seagroves, located 
defendant and he was arrested (T. 49, 51). 
After pleading guilty to the assault on the doorman at 
the Playhouse Bar, the trial proceeded on the aggravated assault 
charge stemming from the incident at the motel (T. 204) 
Defendant was found guilty and waived time before sentencing (T. 
208). In view of defendant's background, which includes a 1981 
murder conviction in Texas (T. 208), defendant was incarcerated. 
He was ordered to serve zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison for aggravated assault on Terry Gideon, and to then serve 
six months in the Iron County jail for the assault on Kurt MacKay 
(R. 107). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms for his aggravated 
assault and assault convictions. There were two victims, who 
each sustained significant injuries. The consecutive sentences 
do not constitute a violation of the Utah Constitution, and do 




DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED TO 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION FOR HIS 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT 
CONVICTIONS. 
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in imposing an indeterminate prison 
term of up to five years for the aggravated assault conviction 
with a consecutive six month jail term for the simple assault 
conviction. Defendant contends that the imposition of the jail 
term following imprisonment is an "unconstitutional interference 
with the prerogatives of the Utah State Board of Pardons" and 
"inappropriately interferes with the discretion granted to the 
Board of Pardons" in setting the date and terms of parole 
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, State v. Seagroves/ No. 890154-
CA). Defendant acknowledges, citing State v. Jolivet, 713 P.2d 
707 (Utah 1986), that a trial court has broad discretion in 
imposition of sentence, but claims that the trial court abused 
its discretion in this instance. Defendant has cited no legal 
authority upon which to base his claim, and for that reason 
alone, his argument must fail. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1986); State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court has considerable discretion in its 
determination of an appropriate sentence, so long as the sentence 
is within the bounds of authority authorized by the legislature. 
State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986). According to 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988), the trial court may, 
within the limits of other sentencing provisions contained in 
Chapter 3, impose any one of the following sentences or a 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of 
public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
Further, it is within the discretion of the trial court to 
determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. 
The sentencing court Mmay impose consecutive sentences for 
separate offenses committed in the course of a single criminal 
episode." Jolivet, 712 P.2d at 844. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-
401(1) (1978) (amended 1989) provides that "A court shall 
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall 
run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that 
they shall run consecutively." Subsection (9) provides that the 
"section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court 
to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases." The 
legislature, therefore, rectified any possible ambituity in the 
statute regarding consecutive sentences for misdemeanors by 
enacting subsection (9). 
The aggregate minimum of all consecutive sentences 
imposed may not exceed 12 years. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 
(1978) (amended 1989). Otherwise, there is no legal limitation 
on the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
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Defendant's attempts to elevate his claim to a 
constitutional dimension must fail. His claim of a 
constitutional violation stems from the imposition of consecutive 
sentences and the alleged infringement on the board of pardon's 
power to parole. However, defendant has no constitutional right 
to parole at all, or at least not until a parole date has been 
established. Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah 1984), 
citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) ("[b]efore a parole 
date has been established, an inmate has no constitutional right 
to be placed on parole"); Swisher v. Hamilton, 12 Kan. App. 2d 
183, 740 P.2d 94 (1987); State v. Dictado, 102 Wash.2d 277, 687 
P.2d 172 (1984); Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511 (Wyo. 1983). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court recognized in 
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), that prior to 1980, 
Article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution gave the board 
of pardons virtually unfettered discretion in determining parole 
dates and limitations. However, after the 1980 amendment, the 
discretion of the Board became subject to "such conditions as may 
be established by the Legislature. . . . " Id.., citing Utah 
Const, art. VII, S 12. The Bishop court upheld the 
constitutionality of the power of the legislature to enact 
provisions which affect the board's parole decisions. In the 
present case, the legislature has provided for the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 (1978) (amended 
1989). The imposition of the consecutive six month jail sentence 
in this case does not unconstitutionally interfere with the 
prerogatives of the board of pardons. 
.in-
Defendant also asserts that the sentence in this case 
"inappropriately interferes with the discretion granted to the 
Board of Pardons in setting the conditions and terms of parole 
and may even be seen to interfere with the Board of Pardon's 
discretion in setting an earlier release date" and may preclude 
the board from "requiring a term in a half-way house." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6. Defendant's claim does not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, as he asserts, 
which would entitle him to relief. Regardless, the manner in 
which defendant's sentence was imposed in this case does not 
shackle the board's authority. The board of pardons does not 
have authority over the class B misdemeanor conviction. Utah 
Code Ann. S§ 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989) and 77-27-9 (Supp. 1989). 
However, it has authority to place defendant on parole for three 
years. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-202(1) (Supp. 1988). Consequently, 
once the board determines defendant's release date, assuming it 
is less than the maximum five year period and his sentence is not 
terminated, defendant could then be placed on parole for three 
years. During the initial six-month term of the three year 
period, defendant would serve the jail term. The board would 
continue to have jurisdiction over the defendant for two and one 
half years and could subsequently determine what terms and 
conditions would be required as a condition of parole, Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989), which could include placement in a 
half way house if deemed appropriate. 
The imposition of the consecutive six-month jail term 
does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the power of the board 
-11-
of pardons. Defendant assaulted two people. The assault on Kurt 
Mackay, although charged as a misdemeanor, was significant; 
defendant fractured his skull and jaw as the result of striking 
him with his fist and stomping on his head. The assault on Terry 
Gideon was also significant; defendant stabbled him with a knife 
eleven times. Defendant was convicted in 1981 in Texas for 
murder. Given his background and his assault on two people, it 
is entirely appropriate that he be given a severe sentence, 
including consecutive sentences for the two convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Daryl Wayne Seagroves, was properly 
sentenced to consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison 
and to six months in the county jail for aggravated assault and 
misdemeanor assault convictions, respectively. For the foregoing 
reasons, and any additonal reasons advanced at oral argument, the 
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
REPSECTFULLY submitted this jfj^day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
/ 7 t e^ MI^7^— 
/ BARBARA BEAR^ON 
' Assistant Attorney General 
^ 0_ 
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